Results for 'Eric Sven Ristad'

703 found
Order:
  1. Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by representation theorems, going back to Ramsey (1926), which tell us how to define or measure subjective probability by observable preferences. However, standard representation theorems make strong rationality assumptions, in particular expected utility maximization. How do we ascribe subjective probability to agents which do not satisfy these strong rationality assumptions? I present a representation theorem with weak rationality assumptions which can be used to define or measure (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Mathematical Explanation: A Contextual Approach.Sven Delarivière, Joachim Frans & Bart Van Kerkhove - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (2):309-329.
    PurposeIn this article, we aim to present and defend a contextual approach to mathematical explanation.MethodTo do this, we introduce an epistemic reading of mathematical explanation.ResultsThe epistemic reading not only clarifies the link between mathematical explanation and mathematical understanding, but also allows us to explicate some contextual factors governing explanation. We then show how several accounts of mathematical explanation can be read in this approach.ConclusionThe contextual approach defended here clears up the notion of explanation and pushes us towards a pluralist vision (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3. Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Is more information always better? Or are there some situations in which more information can make us worse off? Good (1967) argues that expected utility maximizers should always accept more information if the information is cost-free and relevant. But Good's argument presupposes that you are certain you will update by conditionalization. If we relax this assumption and allow agents to be uncertain about updating, these agents can be rationally required to reject free and relevant information. Since there are good reasons (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Inexact Knowledge 2.0.Sven Rosenkranz & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (8):1-19.
    Many of our sources of knowledge only afford us knowledge that is inexact. When trying to see how tall something is, or to hear how far away something is, or to remember how long something lasted, we may come to know some facts about the approximate size, distance or duration of the thing in question but we don’t come to know exactly what its size, distance or duration is. In some such situations we also have some pointed knowledge of how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5. A Dilemma for Solomonoff Prediction.Sven Neth - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (2):288-306.
    The framework of Solomonoff prediction assigns prior probability to hypotheses inversely proportional to their Kolmogorov complexity. There are two well-known problems. First, the Solomonoff prior is relative to a choice of Universal Turing machine. Second, the Solomonoff prior is not computable. However, there are responses to both problems. Different Solomonoff priors converge with more and more data. Further, there are computable approximations to the Solomonoff prior. I argue that there is a tension between these two responses. This is because computable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. The "Artificial Mathematician" Objection: Exploring the (Im)possibility of Automating Mathematical Understanding.Sven Delarivière & Bart Van Kerkhove - 2017 - In B. Sriraman (ed.), Humanizing Mathematics and its Philosophy. Birkhäuser. pp. 173-198.
    Reuben Hersh confided to us that, about forty years ago, the late Paul Cohen predicted to him that at some unspecified point in the future, mathematicians would be replaced by computers. Rather than focus on computers replacing mathematicians, however, our aim is to consider the (im)possibility of human mathematicians being joined by “artificial mathematicians” in the proving practice—not just as a method of inquiry but as a fellow inquirer.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. Unfollowed Rules and the Normativity of Content.Eric V. Tracy - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):323-344.
    Foundational theories of mental content seek to identify the conditions under which a mental representation expresses, in the mind of a particular thinker, a particular content. Normativists endorse the following general sort of foundational theory of mental content: A mental representation r expresses concept C for agent S just in case S ought to use r in conformity with some particular pattern of use associated with C. In response to Normativist theories of content, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin and Åsa Wikforss propose a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  8. Chancy Modus Ponens.Sven Neth - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):632-638.
    Chancy modus ponens is the following inference scheme: ‘probably φ’, ‘if φ, then ψ’, therefore, ‘probably ψ’. I argue that Chancy modus ponens is invalid in general. I further argue that the invalidity of Chancy modus ponens sheds new light on the alleged counterexample to modus ponens presented by McGee. I close by observing that, although Chancy modus ponens is invalid in general, we can recover a restricted sense in which this scheme of inference is valid.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  9. Meaning and Anti-Meaning in Life and What Happens After We Die.Sven Nyholm - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 90:11-31.
    The absence of meaningfulness in life is meaninglessness. But what is the polar opposite of meaningfulness? In recent and ongoing work together with Stephen Campbell and Marcello di Paola respectively, I have explored what we dub ‘anti-meaning’: the negative counterpart of positive meaning in life. Here, I relate this idea of ‘anti-meaningful’ actions, activities, and projects to the topic of death, and in particular the deaths or suffering of those who will live after our own deaths. Connecting this idea of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. Goodman's New Riddle of Induction Explained in Words of One Syllable.Sven Neth - manuscript
    I explain the New Riddle of Induction (Goodman 1946, 1955) in very brief words.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Memory and Truth.Sven Bernecker - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 51-62.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  12. Deep Brain Stimulation, Authenticity and Value.Sven Nyholm & Elizabeth O’Neill - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (4):658-670.
    In this paper, we engage in dialogue with Jonathan Pugh, Hannah Maslen, and Julian Savulescu about how to best interpret the potential impacts of deep brain stimulation on the self. We consider whether ordinary people’s convictions about the true self should be interpreted in essentialist or existentialist ways. Like Pugh et al., we argue that it is useful to understand the notion of the true self as having both essentialist and existentialist components. We also consider two ideas from existentialist philosophy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  13. Visual Memory and the Bounds of Authenticity.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 445-464.
    It has long been known that memory need not be a literal reproduction of the past but may be a constructive process. To say that memory is a constructive process is to say that the encoded content may differ from the retrieved content. At the same time, memory is bound by the authenticity constraint which states that the memory content must be true to the subject's original perception of reality. This paper addresses the question of how the constructive nature of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  14. Measuring Belief and Risk Attitude.Sven Neth - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:354–364.
    Ramsey (1926) sketches a proposal for measuring the subjective probabilities of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. I show how to extend the spirit of Ramsey's method to a strictly wider class of agents: risk-weighted expected utility maximizers (Buchak 2013). In particular, I show how we can measure the risk attitudes of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. Further, we can leverage (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. Collective Understanding — A conceptual defense for when groups should be regarded as epistemic agents with understanding.Sven Delarivière - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2).
    Could groups ever be an understanding subject (an epistemic agent ascribed with understanding) or should we keep our focus exclusively on the individuals that make up the group? The way this paper will shape an answer to this question is by starting from a case we are most willing to accept as group understanding, then mark out the crucial differences with an unconvincing case, and, ultimately, explain why these differences matter. In order to concoct the cases, however, we need to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  16. On the Blameworthiness of Forgetting.Sven Bernecker - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 241-258.
    It is a mistake to think that we cannot be morally responsible for forgetting because, as a matter of principle, forgetting is outside of our control. Sometimes we do have control over our forgetting. When forgetting is under our control there is no question that it is the proper object of praise and blame. But we can also be morally responsible for forgetting something when it is beyond our control that we forget that thing. The literature contains three accounts of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. The philosophy of memory today: Editors' introduction.Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-3.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  18. Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.
    The overwhelming majority of those who theorize about implicit biases posit that these biases are caused by some sort of association. However, what exactly this claim amounts to is rarely specified. In this paper, I distinguish between different understandings of association, and I argue that the crucial senses of association for elucidating implicit bias are the cognitive structure and mental process senses. A hypothesis is subsequently derived: if associations really underpin implicit biases, then implicit biases should be modulated by counterconditioning (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   153 citations  
  19. Social Robots and Society.Sven Nyholm, Cindy Friedman, Michael T. Dale, Anna Puzio, Dina Babushkina, Guido Lohr, Bart Kamphorst, Arthur Gwagwa & Wijnand IJsselsteijn - 2023 - In Ibo van de Poel (ed.), Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers. pp. 53-82.
    Advancements in artificial intelligence and (social) robotics raise pertinent questions as to how these technologies may help shape the society of the future. The main aim of the chapter is to consider the social and conceptual disruptions that might be associated with social robots, and humanoid social robots in particular. This chapter starts by comparing the concepts of robots and artificial intelligence and briefly explores the origins of these expressions. It then explains the definition of a social robot, as well (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Triangular Externalism.Sven Bernecker - 2013 - In Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 443-455.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  21. The Quantified Relationship.John Danaher, Sven Nyholm & Brian D. Earp - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics 18 (2):3-19.
    The growth of self-tracking and personal surveillance has given rise to the Quantified Self movement. Members of this movement seek to enhance their personal well-being, productivity, and self-actualization through the tracking and gamification of personal data. The technologies that make this possible can also track and gamify aspects of our interpersonal, romantic relationships. Several authors have begun to challenge the ethical and normative implications of this development. In this article, we build upon this work to provide a detailed ethical analysis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  22. The Neophenomenological Theory of Subjectivity as a Tool for Comparative Studies.Sven Sellmer - 2011 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 (1):9-22.
    The conception of subjectivity developed by the German philosopher Hermann Schmitz (1927-) is especially suitable for cross-cultural investigations because its foundations lie in human experiences that are basic and universal. The paper has two aims. Firstly, to give an outline of Schmitz’s theory. Secondly, to show its usefulness (and its limits) by interpreting some Greek and Indian philosophers which, at the same time, represent certain main approaches to the problem of subjectivity.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.
    Inquiry, Volume 57, Issue 1, Page 55-96, February 2014.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   95 citations  
  24. Self-Knowledge and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 1998 - In Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Center for the Study of Language and Inf. pp. 333-349.
    In this paper I argue in favor of the compatibility of semantic externalism with privileged self-knowledge by showing that an argument for incompatibilism from switching scenarios fails. Given the inclusion theory of self-knowledge, the hypothesis according to which I am having twater thoughts while thinking that I have water thoughts simply isn't a (entertainable) possibility. When I am on Earth thinking earthian concepts, I cannot believe that I am thinking that twater is wet for I don't have the concept of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  25. Automation, Work and the Achievement Gap.John Danaher & Sven Nyholm - 2021 - AI and Ethics 1 (3):227–237.
    Rapid advances in AI-based automation have led to a number of existential and economic concerns. In particular, as automating technologies develop enhanced competency they seem to threaten the values associated with meaningful work. In this article, we focus on one such value: the value of achievement. We argue that achievement is a key part of what makes work meaningful and that advances in AI and automation give rise to a number achievement gaps in the workplace. This could limit people’s ability (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  26. Reinholds linguistischer Schematismus.Sven Bernecker - 2018 - In Violetta Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Proceedings of the 12th International Kant Congress: Nature and Freedom. de Gruyter. pp. 3369-3377.
    In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich eine neue Interpretation der Reinhold’schen Sprachphilosophie vor. Mein Ziel ist es zu erklären, wie Reinhold der Meinung sein konnte, seine Sprachphilosophie stelle, ebenso wie seine Elementarphilosophie, den Versuch dar, Kants Kritische Philosophie zu fundieren. Außerdem möchte ich zeigen, worin die philosophische Bedeutung von Reinholds Ansatz gegenüber den Sprachphilosophien seiner Zeitgenossen besteht.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. Autonomy and the Moral Authority of Advance Directives.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (5):500-520.
    Although advance directives are widely believed to be a key way to safeguard the autonomy of incompetent medical patients, significant questions exist about their moral authority. The main philosophical concern involves cases in which an incompetent patient no longer possesses the desires on which her advance directive was based. The question is, does that entail that prior expressions of medical choices are no longer morally binding? I believe that the answer is “yes.” I argue that a patient’s autonomy is not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  28. Troubles with Bayesianism: An introduction to the psychological immune system.Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (2):141-157.
    A Bayesian mind is, at its core, a rational mind. Bayesianism is thus well-suited to predict and explain mental processes that best exemplify our ability to be rational. However, evidence from belief acquisition and change appears to show that we do not acquire and update information in a Bayesian way. Instead, the principles of belief acquisition and updating seem grounded in maintaining a psychological immune system rather than in approximating a Bayesian processor.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  29. The Problem of Evil and the Grammar of Goodness.Eric Wiland - 2018 - Religions 9.
    Here I consider the two most venerated arguments about the existence of God: the Ontological Argument and the Argument from Evil. The Ontological Argument purports to show that God’s nature guarantees that God exists. The Argument from Evil purports to show that God’s nature, combined with some plausible facts about the way the world is, guarantees (or is very compelling grounds for thinking) that God does not exist. Obviously, both arguments cannot be sound. But I argue here that they are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. The Logic of the Evidential Conditional.Eric Raidl, Andrea Iacona & Vincenzo Crupi - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (3):758-770.
    In some recent works, Crupi and Iacona have outlined an analysis of ‘if’ based on Chrysippus’ idea that a conditional holds whenever the negation of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent. This paper presents a sound and complete system of conditional logic that accommodates their analysis. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a general method elaborated by Raidl, which applies to a wide range of systems of conditional logic.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  31. Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception.Eric Mandelbaum - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):267-283.
    After presenting evidence about categorization behavior, this paper argues for the following theses: 1) that there is a border between perception and cognition; 2) that the border is to be characterized by perception being modular (and cognition not being so); 3) that perception outputs conceptualized representations, so views that posit that the output of perception is solely non-conceptual are false; and 4) that perceptual content consists of basic-level categories and not richer contents.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  32. Memory in Analytic Philosophy.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Dmitriĭ Vladimirovich Nikulin (ed.), Memory: A History. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 298-315.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. Problems and mysteries of the many languages of thought.Eric Mandelbaum, Yarrow Dunham, Roman Feiman, Chaz Firestone, E. J. Green, Daniel Harris, Melissa M. Kibbe, Benedek Kurdi, Myrto Mylopoulos, Joshua Shepherd, Alexis Wellwood, Nicolas Porot & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2022 - Cognitive Science 46 (12): e13225.
    “What is the structure of thought?” is as central a question as any in cognitive science. A classic answer to this question has appealed to a Language of Thought (LoT). We point to emerging research from disparate branches of the field that supports the LoT hypothesis, but also uncovers diversity in LoTs across cognitive systems, stages of development, and species. Our letter formulates open research questions for cognitive science concerning the varieties of rules and representations that underwrite various LoT-based systems (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  34. Against alief.Eric Mandelbaum - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):197-211.
    This essay attempts to clarify the nature and structure of aliefs. First I distinguish between a robust notion of aliefs and a deflated one. A robust notion of aliefs would introduce aliefs into our psychological ontology as a hitherto undiscovered kind, whereas a deflated notion of aliefs would identify aliefs as a set of pre-existing psychological states. I then propose the following dilemma: one the one hand, if aliefs have propositional content, then it is unclear exactly how aliefs differ from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  35. Evidence, reasons, and knowledge in the reasons-first program.Paul Silva & Sven Bernecker - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):617-625.
    Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first approach from ethics to epistemology. In what follows we explore how (not) to account for the evidence-that relation within the reasons-first program, we explain how factive content views of evidence can be resilient in the face of Schroeder’s criticisms, and we explain how knowledge from falsehood threatens Schroeder’s view of knowledge. Along the way we sketch a reliabilist account of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Ethical Accident Algorithms for Autonomous Vehicles and the Trolley Problem: Three Philosophical Disputes.Sven Nyholm - 2022 - In Hallvard Lillehammer (ed.), The Trolley Problem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 211-230.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Everything and More: The Prospects of Whole Brain Emulation.Eric Mandelbaum - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (8):444-459.
    Whole Brain Emulation has been championed as the most promising, well-defined route to achieving both human-level artificial intelligence and superintelligence. It has even been touted as a viable route to achieving immortality through brain uploading. WBE is not a fringe theory: the doctrine of Computationalism in philosophy of mind lends credence to the in-principle feasibility of the idea, and the standing of the Human Connectome Project makes it appear to be feasible in practice. Computationalism is a popular, independently plausible theory, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  38. The Technological Future of Love.Sven Nyholm, John Danaher & Brian D. Earp - 2022 - In André Grahle, Natasha McKeever & Joe Saunders (eds.), Philosophy of Love in the Past, Present, and Future. Routledge. pp. 224-239.
    How might emerging and future technologies—sex robots, love drugs, anti-love drugs, or algorithms to track, quantify, and ‘gamify’ romantic relationships—change how we understand and value love? We canvass some of the main ethical worries posed by such technologies, while also considering whether there are reasons for “cautious optimism” about their implications for our lives. Along the way, we touch on some key ideas from the philosophies of love and technology.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. There Is No Progress in Philosophy.Eric Dietrich - 2011 - Essays in Philosophy 12 (2):9.
    Except for a patina of twenty-first century modernity, in the form of logic and language, philosophy is exactly the same now as it ever was; it has made no progress whatsoever. We philosophers wrestle with the exact same problems the Pre-Socratics wrestled with. Even more outrageous than this claim, though, is the blatant denial of its obvious truth by many practicing philosophers. The No-Progress view is explored and argued for here. Its denial is diagnosed as a form of anosognosia, a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  40. Curable and Incurable Vice in Aristotle.Eric Solis - forthcoming - Ancient Philosophy.
    I argue that central to Aristotle’s account of vice is a distinction between two varieties of vicious person: those for whom character change is possible (the curable), and those for whom it is not (the incurable). Recognizing this distinction and drawing out the ideas which ground it shows why Aristotle’s discussions of vice in EN vii and ix 4 are not inconsistent.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Inference as Consciousness of Necessity.Eric Marcus - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):304-322.
    Consider the following three claims. (i) There are no truths of the form ‘p and ~p’. (ii) No one holds a belief of the form ‘p and ~p’. (iii) No one holds any pairs of beliefs of the form {p, ~p}. Irad Kimhi has recently argued, in effect, that each of these claims holds and holds with metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, he maintains that they are ultimately not distinct claims at all, but the same claim formulated in different ways. I find (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  42. Extended Minds in Vats.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 54-72.
    Hilary Putnam has famously argued that “we are brains in a vat” is necessarily false. The argument assumes content externalism (also known as semantic externalism and anti-individualism), that is, the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in part, on external or relational properties of the subject’s environment. Recently content externalism has given rise to the hypothesis of the extended mind, whereby mental states are not only externally individuated but also externally located states. This chapter argues that when (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Making sense of domain specificity.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2023 - Cognition 240 (C):105583.
    The notion of domain specificity plays a central role in some of the most important debates in cognitive science. Yet, despite the widespread reliance on domain specificity in recent theorizing in cognitive science, this notion remains elusive. Critics have claimed that the notion of domain specificity can't bear the theoretical weight that has been put on it and that it should be abandoned. Even its most steadfast proponents have highlighted puzzles and tensions that arise once one tries to go beyond (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. The ontology of concepts: Abstract objects or mental representations?Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):561-593.
    What is a concept? Philosophers have given many different answers to this question, reflecting a wide variety of approaches to the study of mind and language. Nonetheless, at the most general level, there are two dominant frameworks in contemporary philosophy. One proposes that concepts are mental representations, while the other proposes that they are abstract objects. This paper looks at the differences between these two approaches, the prospects for combining them, and the issues that are involved in the dispute. We (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  45. Why Numbers Are Sets.Eric Steinhart - 2002 - Synthese 133 (3):343-361.
    I follow standard mathematical practice and theory to argue that the natural numbers are the finite von Neumann ordinals. I present the reasons standardly given for identifying the natural numbers with the finite von Neumann's (e.g., recursiveness; well-ordering principles; continuity at transfinite limits; minimality; and identification of n with the set of all numbers less than n). I give a detailed mathematical demonstration that 0 is { } and for every natural number n, n is the set of all natural (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  46. Moral Advice and Joint Agency.Eric Wiland - 2018 - In Mark C. Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 102-123.
    There are many alleged problems with trusting another person’s moral testimony, perhaps the most prominent of which is that it fails to deliver moral understanding. Without moral understanding, one cannot do the right thing for the right reason, and so acting on trusted moral testimony lacks moral worth. This chapter, however, argues that moral advice differs from moral testimony, differs from it in a way that enables a defender of moral advice to parry this worry about moral worth. The basic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Dispositional and categorical properties, and Russellian Monism.Eric Hiddleston - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):65-92.
    This paper has two main aims. The first is to present a general approach for understanding “dispositional” and “categorical” properties; the second aim is to use this approach to criticize Russellian Monism. On the approach I suggest, what are usually thought of as “dispositional” and “categorical” properties are really just the extreme ends of a spectrum of options. The approach allows for a number of options between these extremes, and it is plausible, I suggest, that just about everything of scientific (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  48. Warum das Gettier-Problem kein Scheinproblem ist.Sven Bernecker - 2013 - In Gerhard Ernst & Lisa Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem. Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren. Münster: mentis. pp. 29-48.
    Wie der Titel des Aufsatzes bereits signalisiert, werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass das Gettier-Problem ein genuines Problem ist, keines, das sich lediglich einer falschen Fragestellung verdankt. Versuche, das Gettier-Problem aufzulösen statt zu lösen, sind zum Scheitern verurteilt. In den ersten beiden Abschnitten wird eine Typologisierung von Gettier-Fällen vorgenommen und zwischen zwei Lesarten des Gettier-Problems unterschieden. Im dritten Abschnitt werden einige Auflösungsversuche des Gettier-Problems der kritischen Prüfung unterzogen. Der vierte Abschnitt diskutiert die reliabilistische Antwort auf das Gettier-Problem. Es wird gezeigt, dass (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49. How to acquire a concept.Eric Margolis - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):347-369.
    In this paper, I develop a novel account of concept acquisition for an atomistic theory of concepts. Conceptual atomism is rarely explored in cognitive science because of the feeling that atomistic treatments of concepts are inherently nativistic. My model illustrates, on the contrary, that atomism does not preclude the learning of a concept.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   84 citations  
  50. Reinholds Erkenntnistheorie des Dissens.Sven Bernecker - 2012 - In Violetta Stolz, Martin Bendeli & Marion Heinz (eds.), Wille, Willkür, Freiheit: Reinholds Freiheitskonzeption im Kontext der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunders. de Gruyter. pp. 453-469.
    This paper explains and defends Reinhold’s epistemology of disagreement. The concept of agreement is of central importance for Reinhold’s philosophy. He attempts to settle the most basic disputes among post-Kantian philosophers by offering intermediate positions that reconcile the seemingly incompatible views. Moreover, Reinhold argues for epistemic objectivism, that is, the thesis that a group of philosophers sharing the same information and respecting each other’s opinion may not reasonably disagree. If the members of such a group search for truth then they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 703